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Scientific literature and practice, notably expert reports, commonly involve misinterpretations
of standard statistics, such as the p-value, or the calculation of so-called “3-standard deviation
intervals,” elements upon which decisions in medicine, physics, or legal matters are based1. Such
instances of expert reporting reflect a misreading of the way in which scientists should assist the
judiciary in assessing results coming from analytical laboratories. A recent example of such a
practice are the conclusions of the international report on urine specimens collected among athletes
participating in the Vancouver and Sochi Winter Olympic Games (report dated 5th October,
2017)2,3.
Uncertainty is a complication that accompanies participants of the justice system who face
inference and decision-making as core aspects of their activities. Inference relates to the use of
incomplete information, as given by scientific findings, in order to reason about propositions of
interest, such as whether the quantity of a given substance in some bodily fluid is larger than a
legal threshold. In turn, decision-makers, notably judges, are required to make practical decisions,
such as declaring whether or not an athlete has used a performance-enhancing substance. Inference
and decisions of this kind abound in the legal field. Toxicology laboratories, across jurisdictional
systems, are regularly asked to quantify the amount of target substances (e.g., alcohol, illegal drugs,
biological markers) detected in, for example, blood samples taken from persons of interest (e.g.,
Karkazis and Jordan-Young, 2015).
Inference and decision require logical assistance because unaided human reasoning is liable to
bias and misinterpretation. These represent causes of concern because fallacious reasoning and
erroneous conclusions in legal proceedings risk endangering the fairness of the proceedings and can
lead to miscarriages of justice. Statistical approaches are often used to support expert conclusions
1Hence the use of “adhockeries” in the title. The term adhockery was introduced by I. J. Good, and used also by de Finetti
(e.g., de Finetti, 1993a,b), to denote the use of improvised measures rather than a robust and logic methodology.
2Report available at https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/IOC/Who-We-Are/
Commissions/Disciplinary-Commission/IOC-DC-Schmid/Appendix-VIII-CHUV-Report-Prof-Burnier-06-10-2017.
pdf. Hereafter, the Report.
3For a previous example of the use of statistics in a case of alleged doping see, e.g., the Andrus Veerpalu case (Fischer and
Berry, 2014)
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but inferential misunderstandings regrettably plague disciplines
such as forensic science and medicine when scientists report
on statistical analyses conducted as part of their casework or
research.
The case on which we intend to comment can be briefly
summarized as follows. The International Olympic Committee
requested statistical analyses on results of urine examinations
performed on samples coming from the XXII Olympic Winter
Games in Sochi, with the aim of identifying athletes who had
used prohibited substances. Specifically, the question was “[t]o
determine [. . . ] if the values are within the reference values
obtained from the control population at the XXII Olympic
Winter Games and in agreement with data published.” (Report
at p. 3). A potentially doped athlete, called in the Report “true
outlier,” was defined as a person having a given bio-chemical
parameter value—for example, urinary sodium concentration—
greater than a reference mean plus three standard deviations.
The reference mean and standard deviation were calculated
using data from reference athletes, considered not doped, of the
Vancouver Olympic Winter Games.
As an illustration, consider a measured target substance (e.g.,
urinary sodium concentration), where the experimental unit is a
urine sample from a person under investigation. Themean values
reported for the sodium concentration in urines in the reference
male (female) population of athletes are 95.4 (67.39)mmol/l. The
reported standard deviation values are 49.37 and 40.88 mmol/l,
respectively (see Report at p. 6). According to the “three standard
deviation rule,” athletes with values greater than 243.51 (or 190,
for women) are considered to be outliers. Thus, the measurement
would be said to meet the requirement for establishing the
presence of an unrealistic level of a target substance in urine if
the measurement for the investigated sample were larger than the
upper value of the bound in a reference population. It was noted
in the report that “[w]ith this approach, we identify 13 samples
(of 5 men and 8 women) which are definitively out of the range.”
(Report at p. 2).
As a preliminary, it is worth noting that such an approach
for the treatment and reporting of experimental results does not
address the inferential and decisional issues at stake. Instead,
it is merely descriptive. This does not mean, though, that it is
intrinsically wrong: scientists widely rely on effective descriptive
methods of exploratory data analysis to illustrate, for example,
how population data are distributed, where given sample data are
located and how they spread. However, such a description does
not fully address the questions of interest for the decision-maker,
which are: How can we use data (or a summary of them) on the
Vancouver Olympic athletes to infer something about the value
of the urinary sodium concentration in the reference population?
and: How can we conclude that a new measurement from a given
athlete is in fact an outlier (or an anomalous value) with reference
to this population? These are intrinsically inferential questions,
not descriptive ones, and remain unresolved with the approach
taken in the report, as we explain below.
It is commonly understood, and unquestioned, that
measurements on urinary samples taken from individuals
of a given population will show some variation. Stated otherwise,
the results will, in some sense, distribute. Basic statistics such
as the mean and the standard deviation of a quantity of interest
(e.g., the sodium concentration) used to describe the reference
samples from the Vancouver Olympic athletes represent indeed
succinct and informative summaries. The mean provides a
measure of location and the standard deviation provides a
measure of dispersion (spread) of the available measurements.
In this context, the “three standard deviation rule” may have
some appeal. Provided that data distribute symmetrically
around the mean, at least approximately, then values within one
standard deviation of the mean account for about 68% of the
observations, while two standard deviations account for about
95% and three standard deviations account for about 99.7% of
the values. The 68-95-99.7 rule is a shorthand used to remember
the approximate percentage of values that lie within a band
around the mean with a width of two, four and six standard
deviations, respectively. It is a rule to describe the available data
(i.e., measurements from Vancouver athletes), but not to infer
something about a new value coming from a new athlete, as
emphasized also in Berry (2008).
However, does this rule allow one to conclude that values
outside this range are necessarily “outliers”—lying at an
abnormal distance from other values? Obviously, any set of
observations contains extremes: theminimum and themaximum
value are extremes. Notwithstanding, it is understandable to
express concerns in situations, such as the case discussed
here, where the highlighted extremes are not only the largest
(or, in other cases, the smallest) observation, but are actually
“extremely extreme”: they are apparently inconsistent with
the reference observations and therefore candidates for being
considered “outliers.” It is no accident to term these values
“candidates.” Several reasons can, in isolation or combined,
account for extreme observations: first, natural variation, beyond
the currently known bands, but also laboratory measurement
or recording errors, or even intentional tampering, such as
the addition of a target substance (here salt). Since these are
potential accounts for the observations, it is—by definition—
a matter of a personal judgment on the part of the scientist
to decide when a given observation appears to be inconsistent
with the remainder set of data. One way to avoid a rigid
and intrinsically arbitrary threshold is to consider at least
one explicit alternative account for the findings: the scientist
could then provide a statistical measure called a “likelihood
ratio” that represents an expression of how the measurements,
whatever their value, extreme or otherwise, are capable of
discriminating amongst competing propositions of interest.
When no discernible alternative hypothesis can be specified (as
in the case of interest) several ways of categorizing suspicious
observations are available (see, e.g., Barnett and Lewis, 1994).
It is common to distinguish between frequentist (or classical)
and Bayesian approaches. Statistical data analyses in the forensic
and medical contexts commonly rely on a so-called “frequentist”
perspective, associated with the idea that statistical conclusions
could be entirely objective, with known error rates. Consider,
for instance, the problem of hypothesis testing, where attempts
at drawing conclusions about competing propositions often rely
on a comparison between the significance level of the test and
the observed significance level, i.e., p-value. A large majority of
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papers published nowadays still propose statistical treatments
based on this quantity. Controversial discussion was initiated by
an editorial of Basic and Applied Social Psychology (Trafimow
and Marks, 2015), expressing the intention to ban from
publication in their journal any paper containing procedures
advocating p-values. This announcement has echoed widely,
from general weekly science journals (e.g., Nuzzo, 2014; Leek
and Peng, 2015) to specialist groups such as the International
Society for Bayesian Analysis (Schmidt et al., 2015). The main
concern expressed in these reactions is not the correctness or
usefulness of frequentist statistical procedures, but rather the
misinterpretations surrounding the use of such procedures and
their consequences. There is a need to emphasize what exactly
the various approaches allow scientists to draw as a conclusion,
and what they do not allow them to say.
One of the major misunderstandings found in the reporting
on significance testing through a p-value consists in interpreting
this value as the probability that the null hypothesis (e.g.,
as previously stated a difference between populations mean
values) is true. This fallacious conclusion is also known as
the fallacy of the transposed conditional. The temptation to
believe that, if an observation is rare under a given hypothesis
it can be regarded as evidence against that hypothesis, must
be resisted4. Bayesian approaches avoid these intricacies by
relying on the fundamental tenet of capturing, using probability,
all uncertainties characterizing a problem. According to these
approaches, discordancy can be assessed by means of a predictive
4“Researchers often rely on the seeming objectivity of the p<0.05 criterion without
realizing that theory behind the p-value is invalidated when analysis is contingent
on data.” (Gelman and Hennig, 2017).
probability to observe a value greater than the particular
(suspicious) observation given the rest of the reference sample,
which allows one to restrict attention to manifestly extreme
(unlikely) observations (Geisser, 1998).
Despite struggles over philosophical stances regarding
statistical inference and decision-making, the restriction of
attention to the sole question of outliers still falls short of the
fundamental problem that the case in question poses. Among
the ultimately disputed questions is the issue of whether there
is sufficient evidence to conclude that a given urine value is an
outlier. The answer to this question cannot rely on scientific
findings only, because it requires the assessment of all available
information, scientific, and other, in a given case. What is more,
it cannot be reduced to a descriptive (statistical) account of
scientific findings, but extends to inference and decision-making,
and associated decision criteria. The latter are not given by
ad-hoc statistical thresholds, but are intimately related to the
decision-maker’s preferences and policy values, which are even
further beyond the scientist’s area of competence.
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